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ABSTRACT   
Access control is necessary for information assurance in many of today's 
applications such as banking and electronic health record. Access control breaches are 
critical security problems that can result from unintended and improper implementation 
of security policies. Security testing can help identify security vulnerabilities early and 
avoid unexpected expensive cost in handling breaches for security architects and security 
engineers. The process of security testing which involves creating tests that effectively 
examine vulnerabilities is a challenging task.  
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) has been widely adopted to support fine-
grained access control. However, in practice, due to its complexity including role 
management, role hierarchy with hundreds of roles, and their associated privileges and 
users, systematically testing RBAC systems is crucial to ensure the security in various 
domains ranging from cyber-infrastructure to mission-critical applications.  
In this thesis, we introduce i) a security testing technique for RBAC systems 
considering the principle of maximum privileges, the structure of the role hierarchy, and 
a new security test coverage criterion; ii) a MTBDD (Multi-Terminal Binary Decision 
Diagram) based representation of RBAC security policy including RHMTBDD (Role 
Hierarchy MTBDD) to efficiently generate effective positive and negative security test 
cases; and iii)  a security testing framework which takes an XACML-based RBAC 
security policy as an input, parses it into a RHMTBDD representation and then generates 
positive and negative test cases. We also demonstrate the efficacy of our approach 
through case studies.  
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CHAPTER 1 
      INTRODUCTION 
 
As technology is getting more and more sophisticated and connected, security is 
becoming an increasingly greater concern. Cyber systems in almost every domain 
including commercial, medical, and entertainment need to overcome adverse activities 
from various malicious entities.  Security policy is defined to accommodate the security 
needs for a system or an infrastructure. Security policy specifies security properties 
needed to be satisfied for a system. Traditional security properties include confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) properties as well as usage property [1]. For example, a 
simple security property to ensure confidentiality could be that no senior-level person can 
write to a junior-level resource and no junior-level person can read a senior-level 
resource [1]. Such and more complex security properties can be specified using security 
policy languages such as XACML [2]. In addition, policy management is one of 
important security mechanisms to check the assurance of the specified security policies 
and enforce those policies. 
Several security mechanisms such as biometrics and crypto primitives have been 
developed to accomplish the required security properties [1]. Access control mechanisms 
are essential to accomplish many of the security properties including confidentiality. Two 
basic access control models are: discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory 
access control (MAC) [1]. DAC based mechanism have been used in various operating 
systems and data bases systems but it is hard to manage since this mechanism is based on 
users’ complex intentions, whereas MAC based mechanisms are very common in the 
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military domain which is not applicable to most computing environments. To address 
inherent limitations in both the mechanisms, another access control model called Role 
based access control (RBAC) [3] was introduced and has become popular since 1) it is 
better aligned with how businesses operate – people are assigned various roles with 
specific privileges in the companies’ appropriate hierarchy and restrictions are put in 
place such as separation of duty (SoD) so that no single person can be over-privileged to 
make any severe harm to the company; and  2) the generality of RBAC can help enforce 
both DAC and MAC based mechanisms [3]. However, its flexibility can be problematic 
in ensuring access control requirements especially for large-scale companies with 
complex, and dynamic role hierarchies and constraints. Hence, automatic testing 
techniques are tremendously needed to ensure that the “implemented” RBAC is 
consistent with the “specified” RBAC. 
Even though security policy may be embedded correctly in the application, 
implementation of the policy may be affected by other factors such as compilers, 
conversions and platforms [4]. Critical consequences arise due to existing security 
vulnerabilities in the system and those vulnerabilities may also be caused by improper 
reuse of software modules such as Application Programming Interface (API) [5]. In 
general, security vulnerabilities are the weaknesses in the system. Often proper 
functioning of codes being tested relies on implicit assumptions such as appropriate use 
of the APIs and correct reuse of the existing software. These assumptions can lead to 
security vulnerabilities, when the code is reused in different contexts. When these 
security vulnerabilities get exploited or exposed, security violations may occur. These 
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violations may cause denial of service, loss of privacy, or even loss of life. Hence, these 
factors necessitate proper testing of the implemented security policy. 
There are four kind of security testing techniques depending upon the type of 
security vulnerabilities or insecurities [6], [7] (classified by their cause) they intend to 
expose, namely i) dependencies, ii) unanticipated user input, iii) design vulnerabilities, 
and iv) implementation vulnerabilities.  Insecurities caused by dependencies happen due 
to use of third party libraries and other interfaces.  Unanticipated user input can be caused 
by an undesirable insertion of input. A technique to expose design vulnerabilities is an 
example of inserting of interfaces in the application in order to perform testing. And, 
implementation vulnerabilities may be useful in determining insecurities such as the man-
in-the-middle attack [8] which is not considered in the application.  
In the context of security, a formal verification technique verifies security policy 
against the security properties whereas a formal validation technique validates the design 
and implementation of the policy [4]. Formal validation can be performed by applying 
test cases which could be of two types: positive and negative. The positive test cases 
correspond to authorization states which are allowed by the access control policy and the 
negative test cases correspond to authorization states which are not allowed by the access 
control policy [4]. Positive test cases basically test legitimacy, whereas the negative test 
cases test for security vulnerabilities e.g. unauthorized access to sensitive resources.  
Analyzing and managing security breaches can be expensive from various 
aspects. Nevertheless, security testing is inevitable. Furthermore, given the dynamic 
nature of RBAC access control, manual testing can be time consuming and tedious; and, 
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may not be even sufficient. Hence, developing automatic techniques for generating 
positive and negative test cases is very crucial.  
 Approach    1.1
In this thesis, we develop a technique for creating positive test as well as negative 
test cases for the correct enforcement of an access control policy based on an RBAC 
model. One of the incentives for adopting an RBAC model is to prevent Privilege 
Escalation. This can also happen during the implementation of the code. Privilege 
escalation occurs when a user or an application is allowed to perform an unauthorized 
action. For example, a user application may access kernel level codes in an operating 
system and a teller may perform an unauthorized action in the bank application so that it 
can lead to security violations in the system.   
There exists a family of RBAC models [9].  RBAC0 is the most basic model and it 
defines “roles” to be groupings of “privileges”; “users” can be “authorized” to multiple 
roles and could exercise only privileges associated with authorized roles that users have 
activated. More complex features such as role hierarchy and constraints are part of 
RBAC1 (Hierarchical RBAC) and RBAC2 (Constrained RBAC), respectively. Role 
hierarchy allows roles to be organized as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) [10] which 
specifies “senior” roles can inherit privileges of “junior” roles. In essence, each role is 
associated with its own “unique” privileges as well as those inherited from roles in the 
role hierarchy. The most general model RBAC3 has all the aforementioned features. In 
this thesis, we first introduce a way to systematically test RBAC policies. Formally, we 
define the security goal for RBAC model and clarify how the positive and negative test 
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cases help fulfill the security goal. Further, we define the semantics of positive and 
negative test cases with respect to role hierarchy.  
In RBAC, a user can be simultaneously authorized to several roles and has the 
option of activating any subset of roles in a session. We espouse the principle of 
Maximum Privilege (as opposed to the principle of Least Privilege used in authorizing 
roles [1]) in order to reduce the number of testing scenarios. The rationale is that the 
potential to “harm” increases monotonically with the increased number of privileges. 
Hence, we generate tests under the assumption that each user activates all the roles 
simultaneously. Further, the reduction of test case is considered by avoiding generating 
duplicate test cases when the subDAG rooted at two authorized roles for a user overlaps. 
This leads to the following benefits for generating test cases: 1) positive test cases are 
generated only for a subset of senior-most non-dominating roles from the set of 
authorized roles, and 2) negative test cases are generated from the role hierarchy obtained 
by deleting the subDAGs rooted at these roles.  
Despite the above two optimizations there could be numerous test cases 
generated. Further, many of these test cases may not be necessary from the security 
testing perspective. For instance, if it is established that a user cannot obtain privileges 
associated with a given role then it may be futile to generate negative tests with respect to 
roles that is senior to this role. With this insight, we define a new coverage criterion for 
negative test cases: generate test cases with respect to the (mutually non-dominating) 
roles which are at most k “fronts” from the subDAG of the role associated with a user. A 
front is a set of roles that is at the “same distance” from a given role node in the role 
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hierarchy which is obtained by deleting the role’s subDAG from the entire role hierarchy. 
The parameter k could be adjusted to control the number of negative tests to be generated 
(and correspondingly the level of security assurance desired).  
RBAC is said to be policy neutral [3]. In other words, other security policies can 
be specified and enforced in conjunction with RBAC. Previously, Multi Terminal Binary 
Decision Diagram (MTBDD) based representation has been proposed to express complex 
security policies [11]. A policy represented in MTBDD is called PMTBDD (Policy in 
MTBDD). MTBDD corresponding to two different policies can be combined to obtain a 
PMTBDD for the combined policy. The advantages of using the PMTBDD for policy 
representation are its compactness and its capability in generating counter examples using 
theorem-proving techniques. In this thesis, we propose a Role Hierarchy MTBDD called 
RHMTBDD to express the RBAC’s role hierarchy and show how it can be combined 
with a PMTBDD. Further, we show how positive and negative test cases can be 
generated from an RHMTBDD. Intuitively, positive and negative test cases are generated 
by traversing specific paths from desired (role) nodes to the appropriate terminal node in 
the RHMTBDD. 
Building upon the security testing technique and RHMTBDD representation of 
RBAC, we also propose a security testing framework for RBAC policies. Our framework 
takes a RBAC security policy expressed in XACML – a language based on XML for 
specifying access control policies [12]. We use a Document Object Modeling (DOM) 
parser [13], [14] to extract role hierarchy information from the RBAC profile of XACML 
and generate the associated RHMTBDD. Further, we generate the positive and negative 
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test cases by traversing the appropriate paths in RHMTBDD and store them in a Java 
container class.  
We also evaluate our framework by generating test cases for a banking 
application. Our evaluation shows that both positive and negative test cases are correctly 
generated and that our framework can efficiently perform security testing for RBAC 
based systems. 
 Contributions  1.2
In summary, the contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 We propose a security testing approach which incorporates the principle of 
Maximum Privileges, structure of the role hierarchy, and a new security test 
coverage criterion to efficiently generate positive and negative security test 
cases. 
 We introduce RHMTBDD that can combine various security policies to 
generate test cases for the more complex security policy. 
 We develop a security testing framework for RBAC policies which takes a 
RBAC security policy expressed in XACML, parses it into a RHMTBDD 
representation, and then generates positive and negative test cases. 
 We validate the proposed framework with in-house developed applications 
and the generated test cases. 
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 Thesis Outline 1.3
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. We introduce and describe 
background concepts and the related work in Chapter 2. The theoretical foundations for 
RBAC policy testing are presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains our security testing 
framework, each phase of the implementation, and evaluation results.  Finally Chapter 5 
concludes this thesis with concluding remarks and future directions. 
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  CHAPTER 2 
          BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
In this chapter, we present foundational concepts and related work with regards to the 
automated security testing for RBAC we present in this thesis. 
 Multi-Terminal Binary Decision Diagram (MTBDD) 2.1
 In this thesis, we adopt MTBDD to create security test cases to validate the 
implementation of the policy. MTBDD has been used in solution for many different 
problems. For example, it was used to create and analyze a large class of models [15]. 
This helped in reducing the "large state model" for a complex system to a "small scale 
component" and consequently harnessing state space explosion.  Further, it has been also 
used to map Boolean vectors to integers in order to verify electric circuits [16]. 
MTBDD is a data structure to compactly represent a Boolean function over a set 
of variables [17]. An MTBDD consists of nodes, edges and terminal nodes [11]. Each 
node represents a predicate whether the attribute assigned to value is true or false. Each 
edge represents the assignment value of the predicate. And each path represents the 
decision label of the result of the Boolean function of the predicates in the path. MTBDD, 
called PMTBDD, can be used to represent a policy. Figure 1 illustrates two policies: P1 
indicates that a faculty member (f) can assign grades (ag) and P3 says if a user is both a 
faculty member and a student, grade assignment is denied.                       
10 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy Representation in MTBDD. 
 MTBDD can be used to combine different policies [11]. For example, in Figure 2, P1 
allows faculty (f) to assign grades (ag), and P2 indicates student(s) can receive grades 
(rg). These two policies are combined to generate P3.   
 
Figure 2: Combining PMTBDDs to get PMTBDD for the aggregate policy.  
Access control policy can be represented with this data structure. Such 
representation is flexible and scalable. Further, it needs less storage space [11].  MTBDD 
can be suitable for finding violations and possible vulnerabilities in a policy. There are 
mainly three terminal nodes in the graph: Permitted, Deny and Not applicable. The 
Permitted (P) node terminates paths which allow the operation for a role in the policy. 
The Deny (D) node terminates paths which do not allow the operation for a role in the 
policy and not applicable (N) node terminates paths, which are not applicable for the 
policy.  
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In this thesis, we leverage MTBDD data structure and convert XACML-based 
RBAC policy into Role Hierarchical Multi Terminal Binary Decision Diagram 
(RHMTBDD).  
 JUnit 2.2
JUnit is a unit testing framework for Java [18] [19]. JUnit helps testers validate 
functionalities of source codes by using unit tests provided by the testers. A test method 
starts with annotation @ to differentiate from regular methods. JUnit has many features 
[18] [19], e.g. it offers many assertions as well as test runner for running test methods and 
showing the results for all test methods. Further, in JUnit testers can define a test suite 
which combines test classes consisting of test methods and run all the tests together.  
 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)   2.3
 RBAC is one of the access control mechanisms to provide the access control 
based on organizational structure. Each user is assigned a set of roles. Each role is 
associated with a set of permissions. Furthermore, each role inherits permissions based on 
a hierarchy [9]. Hierarchical RBAC1 has following components and properties as defined 
in [9]. 
 Sets of Users (U), Roles (R), Permissions (P), and Session (S). 
 
 PA  P × R: permission to role assignment relation. 
 UA   U × R:  user to role assignment relation. 
 user: S  U , a function that maps each session to a single user. 
 RH  R × R, role hierarchy is a partial order on R. 
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 roles: S   2R , where a user can activate a session with any combination of its 
assigned roles and roles junior to those assigned roles.  
 eXtensible Access Control XML (XACML) 2.4
XACML is a general access control policy language [12]. There are many features 
defined in this language such as Policy, PolicySet, Rules, and Target to achieve the 
objective of an access control policy. This language contains PolicySet to construct 
policies. A PolicySet can have multiple policies or PolicySet and vice versa. A single 
Policy can have only one access control policy denoted by Rule. Further, this policy 
contains Target, which contains resources and action for the subject.  XACML is used to 
express deny and permit actions based on the policy. XACML has a specific profile 
tailored for RBAC [20], which is used in this thesis. 
   RBAC profile is used for role based access control policy. Further, hierarchical 
RBAC model can be represented using this profile. RBAC profile contains four kinds of 
policies [20] such as Role <PolicySet>, Permission <PolicySet>, Role Assignment 
<Policy>, and HasPrivilegesOfRole <Policy> [20].  Role <PolicySet> determines a role 
attribute-value pair defined in this policy. Also, it points to the Permission <PolicySet> 
associated with a role. HasPrivilegesOfRole <Policy> is an option to query about the 
subject role in this profile. Permission <PolicySet> policy contains all the actions 
associated with a role attribute-value pair. Role Assignment <Policy> specifies which 
subjects are assigned to a role. Further, this can be used to restrict how many users (or 
combination of users) are allowed to activate the role. However, this policy is optional.  
Inheritance can be achieved in this profile by adding <PolicySetIdReference> and giving 
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reference to the desired role.  For example, if role1 is inheriting permissions from role2, it 
can be achieved by having a tag of <PolicySetIdReference> inside Permission 
<PolicySet> of the role1, where <PolicySetIdReference> is reference to the permissions 
of role2.  
 
1. ………………………………………………….. 
2. <PolicySet xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:policy:schema:os" 
3. PolicySetId="PPS_Manager" 
4. PolicyCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy-combining-
algorithm:permit-overrides"> 
5. <!-- Permissions specifically for the manager role --> 
6. <Policy 
7. PolicyId="Permissions:specifically:for:the:manager:role" 
8. RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit-
overrides"> 
9. <!-- Permission to create an  account  --> 
10. <Rule 
11. RuleId="create a customer account" 
12. Effect="Permit"> 
13. <Target> 
14. <Resources> 
15. <Resource> 
16. <ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
17. <AttributeValue 
18. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Account</AttributeValue> 
19. <ResourceAttributeDesignator 
20. AttributeId="resource-id" 
21. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
22. </ResourceMatch> 
23. </Resource> 
24. </Resources> 
25. <Actions> 
26. <Action> 
27. <ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
28. <AttributeValue 
29. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">credit</AttributeValue> 
30. <ActionAttributeDesignator 
31. AttributeId="action-id" 
32. DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/> 
33. </ActionMatch> 
34. </Action> 
35. </Actions> 
36. </Target> 
37. </Rule> 
38. </Policy> 
39. <PolicySetIdReference>PPS_Customer</PolicySetIdReference> 
40. </PolicySet> 
41. ……………………………………………………………… 
   
 
Figure 3 : RBAC Policy in XACML [2]. 
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Figure 3 is the example of Permission <PolicySet> in RBAC profile. As 
mentioned previously, this policy specifies the permissions associated with a role. In this 
example, the role is Manager, referencing the role <PolicySet> for Manager in Line 3. 
Line 12 tells “Effect” is permitted if role is Manager. Further, Line 18 and Line 29 show 
that Manager can perform an action “credit” on resource called “Account”.  There is 
reference to permissions associated with Customer in Lines 39 with XACML feature 
element <PolicySetIdReference>. This reference tells that Manager can inherit all the 
actions associated with the Customer role.  
  Security Module/Unit Testing 2.5
 Unit testing is obtained by three main actions arrange, act, and assert (AAA) 
[21].  For example, to verify the correctness of the subtract function, testers first need to 
act by arranging and assigning input parameters in its testing unit. Further, testers act by 
calling subtract function and finally assert the expected result with actual result by calling 
function under test.  Same technique can be applied while preforming security testing. 
For example, in hierarchical RBAC testing, arrange is done by creating a role object and 
its associated permission. Further, act is done by checking whether a particular role is 
allowed to perform its actions.  Then, the role object method is called only if it is asserted 
that this operation can be performed through this object. 
   Related Work 2.6
In this chapter, we describe how this thesis work is related to and different from 
other related work. Hu and Ahn [4] have done similar work to generate positive and 
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negative test cases. Their approach involved creating negative test cases by separating 
constraints from Access Control Model Specification (ACMF). Access Control Model 
Specification consists of Model (M), Function (F) and Constraints(C) [4]. In ACMF M 
represents security model and F represents specification such as operation. Constraints 
represents restriction in a policy such as which role is authorized to do what operation. 
After separation of C (Constraints) from ACMF, constraints are given as a separate input 
to the formal verifier. If the formal verifier yields the result as NOT OK, a sequence of 
counter examples gets created and these counter examples could be used to generate 
negative test cases. The process of generating positive test cases is similar; however, 
constraints are negated when C is separated from ACMF. The formal verifier yields the 
result as NOT OK and the counter examples are used to generate the positive test cases.  
Hu and Ahn's approach involves two steps. First, it takes RBAC model and converts into 
RCL2000 [22]; further RCL2000 is translated into ALLOY and given as an input to 
Alloy Analyzer. Finally, test cases are created. In the second step, the RBAC model gets 
translated into Unified Modeling Language (UML) class diagram. Codes are generated 
through UML and test cases created in the first step are validated against the codes. Hu 
and Ahn's method differs from our method. Unlike their method we are not using 
RCL2000 and Alloy analyzer. And they use UML to generate source codes from RBAC 
policy. In our approach we are using RHMTBDD inspired by MTBDD to create security 
test cases. Further, these test cases are incorporated with JUnit specification to validate 
implementation of the codes.  
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Hu and Ahn have extended their work in [23] and designed an authorization 
system for a Financial Service System. They have obtained an authorization system by 
defining requirements, classifying RBAC objects, relations and restrictions for banking 
applications and finally by designing and implementing a banking application system. 
Further, they perform “Conformance testing” on this system which they have designed 
and implemented through specification. They created positive and negative test cases for 
this system. Positive test cases are those cases, which are allowed by the access control 
authorization state. Negative test cases are those cases which are disallowed by access 
control policy. Creation of these test cases is similar to the one described in [4] by 
separating constraints C from ACMF and giving as a separate input to formal verifier. To 
create positive test cases, they created negative constraints and gave it as an input to 
verifier and converted the result into counter examples which become the positive test 
cases. Negative cases are generated through positive constraints and results are converted 
into counter examples which become negative test cases.  Our approach is different in 
generating positive and negative test cases. Their approach is based on logical model. In 
their approach, security testing is based on logical requirement and logical design of the 
system. In our approach first, we parse XACML policy to convert into RHMTBDD. 
Second we create positive and negative test cases by traversing the path in RHMTBDD.  
Hu, Kulkarni and Ahn’s approach used Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) in order 
to find out anomalies in web access control policy [24]. BDD is a special case of 
MTBDD [11]. It has only two terminal nodes: permitted and not permitted.  Their 
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approach does not involve traversing paths to create test cases [23]. They used BDD as a 
set operation to find anomalies in policies. 
 Fisler et al. used MTBDD to verify access control property against policy defined 
in XACML [11]. They used MTBDD to find the impact and existence of the 
vulnerabilities due to the policy changes [11]. Their approach used MTBDD to determine 
the impact through theorem-proving. We use MTBDD to create test cases to validate the 
implementation of the source code against the RBAC policy, whereas their approach is 
focused on analyzing policies. 
  In summary, our approach differs from previously proposed approaches in 
generating test cases.  Additionally, our approach utilizes MTBDD differently and 
modifies MTBDD to convert XACML policy into RHMTBDD with three terminal nodes 
“permitted”, “deny”, and “not applicable”. Our approach uses RHMTBDD to create test 
cases to validate the implementation of the code against RBAC model policy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SECURITY TESTING APPROACH 
 
In this chapter we develop an approach for performing security testing of RBAC policy. 
We first start with some basic definitions followed by the detailed steps for the proposed 
approach. 
 Preliminaries 3.1
In RBAC, any privileges to perform actions on the information (objects) are 
controlled by grouping privileges into roles and assigning users to roles [1].  There are 
several models of RBAC [9]: RBAC0 is the most basic; RBAC1 includes all aspect of 
RBAC0 as well as role hierarchy; RBAC2 also includes all aspects of RBAC0 but has no 
role hierarchy, but instead it has constraints on roles, privileges, and other relations (e.g. 
separation of duty and cardinality constraints); and RBAC3 is the most comprehensive 
RBAC model and it inherits all aspects of both RBAC1 and RBAC2. In this thesis we will 
mainly focus on RBAC1.  
3.1.1 RBAC Model 
There are some basic definitions associated with RBAC (from [1], for RBAC0 
model [9]) required for explaining our framework. The set of authorized actions (called 
transactions in [1], permissions or privileges in [9]) for each role r is denoted as trans(r). 
Although [9] distinguishes between users and subjects (or sessions) – a user is associated 
with multiple subjects with several (subset) of its authorized role activated – in the 
following we use users and subjects interchangeably. The set of active roles of a user or a 
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subject s is denoted as actr(s). The set of authorized roles of a subject s is denoted as 
authr(s). The predicate canexecs(s,t) denotes whether a subject s can perform a 
transaction t (at a given time). The functions actr(), authr(), and canexec() are from [1] 
which we use in this thesis. 
Note that in the case of hierarchical RBAC (RBAC1 model [9]) the set of role 
authorized to a subject is governed by a role inheritance hierarchy (with an associated 
partial order role dominance relation ≥   R×R). Hence, the set of roles authorized to a 
subject s with primary authorized role r is all the roles r’ appearing in the subDAG 
rooted at r in the RBAC hierarchy, i.e., {r’ | r ≥ r’}. We call non-inherited actions 
associated with a role as its unique actions. 
In [1] there are three basic rules associated with RBAC. The role assignment rule 
[canexcs(s,t) => actr(s) ≠ Ф] says that a subject s can perform a transaction only if s is a 
member of an active role. The role authorization rule [actr(s)   authr(s)] says that for 
any subject s, only an authorized role can be activated. Note that a user can have multiple 
active (authorized) roles at any given time. The rule of transaction authorization 
[canexecs(s, t) => t ∈ trans(actr(s))] says that a subject s can only perform its actions 
associated with its active roles. 
3.1.2 Goal of Security Testing 
Intuitively, any violation of these three rules is associated with corresponding 
security vulnerabilities in the system. For example, a violation of role assignment means 
that a subject is able to perform an action even if it has no active roles. There are other 
security problems which also need to be tested for. For example, those that can be 
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associated with availability: A user may be unable to perform an action which is in its 
active role set.  
Hence, a goal of security testing should be to ensure that for every user s the set 
of all permitted actions is equal to the set of all actions associated with all active roles, 
i.e. ,  {t | canexecs(s,t)} == trans(actr(s)). In the following, for the sake of simplicity we 
define canexecs(s) = {t | canexecs(s,t)}.  
3.1.3 Positive and Negative Test Cases 
In our approach we generate two types of test cases: 
1. Positive test cases: ensures P: ∀s canexecs(s) ⊇ trans(actr(s)). Every subject s 
can perform all the actions corresponding to all its active roles. This is done by 
generating positive test cases to check whether a subject with a particular active 
role r can perform all unique actions associated with r as well as all inherited 
actions (in case of hierarchical RBAC) associated with r. The predicate P is 
ensured when all the positive test cases “pass”. 
2. Negative test cases: ensures N: ⌐(∃s canexecs(s) ⊃ trans(actr (s))). There does 
not exist a subject s which can perform an action that does not correspond to any 
of its active roles. This is done by generating negative test cases to check whether 
a user cannot perform any of its non-unique non-inherited actions. Each negative 
test case passes if the subject is not granted access to perform such an action. The 
predicate N is implied if all the negative test cases pass. 
Combining these two sets of test cases ensures that for every subject s: 
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canexecs(s) ⊇ trans(actr(s))˄ ⌐( canexecs(s) ⊃ trans(actr (s))) 
i.e., canexecs(s) == trans(actr(s)). 
 
 Security Testing Approach for RBAC 3.2
In this section, we present our detailed approach for performing security testing for 
RBAC policy.  
3.2.1 Generating tests for single authorized role 
For a user with single authorized role R, the semantics of RBAC authorizes the 
user for all the roles in the subDAG from DAG(R) in the role hierarchy RH. The positive 
test cases are with regards to all the unique and inherited actions for all the roles in this 
subDAG.  The negative test cases are generated by deleting the DAG(R) from RH. This 
effectively implies that actions/privileges associated with roles in DAG(R) are not 
inherited by any roles in RH – DAG(R). Now the negative test cases are generated with 
respect to the actions associated with roles in RH – DAG(R). For example if a user is 
authorized to a single role R, positive test cases with regard to role R are associated with 
permissions in the subDAG rooted at R and negative test cases are related to all the 
privileges associated with RH – DAG(R) as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Positive and Negative Test Case for |auth(r)| = 1. 
 
3.2.2 Optimizing tests for multiple authorized roles 
Although in general the active role set for a user in a session is a subset of 
authorized roles, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that actr(s) = authr(s), i.e., all the 
roles a subject is authorized to ought to be activated by the subject. In essence this 
assumption generates test cases under maximum privileges assigned to a user. The 
rationale is that under this assumption the most serious vulnerabilities (i.e. a user can 
perform actions which they are never allowed) and all inconveniences (i.e. a user is not 
allowed to perform an action even though he is authorized to). This considerably reduces 
the number of test cases since there are 2
|authr(s)|
 different actr(s) sets possible for a given 
authr(s). For example, in Figure 5 a user is authorized to a role, role2. Due to RH, 
authr(u) = {role2, role4, role5, role6}. There are 2
4  
possible subsets for this role so it 
creates test cases only for actr(u) = {role2, role4, role5, role6} instead of creating test 
cases for all different subsets. 
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                  Figure 5: An example role hierarchy. 
Further, assume that there exists a single most dominant role r in the authr(s), i.e. r = 
max≥ (authr(s)), the set of positive and negative test cases can be easily generated based 
on all the unique and inherited actions of role r. In case there is no unique most dominant 
role in authr(s), we can determine maximal subset T of authr(s) such that: 1) any pair of 
roles in T is mutually non-dominating, i.e., if r1, r2 in T then neither r1≥r2 nor r2≥ r1 
unless r1= r2; and 2) If r1 in T then there is no r2 in authr(s) such that r2 ≥ r1 unless r1= r2. 
Basically, T consists of senior-most mutually non-dominating roles from authr(s). The 
positive and negative test cases can now be computed by taking the union of all the 
unique and inherited actions of roles in T. This procedure avoids generating duplicate test 
cases since any role junior to multiple roles in T is only considered once.  
 
Figure 6: Optimizing test cases for mutual non-dominating role. 
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                  Consider roles R and S in Figure 6. They both are mutually non-dominating 
roles. Optimization in creating test cases can be achieved by not duplicating the test cases 
for overlapping area. Suppose in Figure 5 authr(s) = {role4, role5, role6}. We can 
calculate maximal subset T = {role4, role5}. Positive test cases can be generated by 
taking union of all unique and inherited actions of role4 and role5 (that is the union action 
of role4, role5 and role6). And negative test cases can be generated for which are not 
included in the union set of positive tests. Positive test cases = {union actions: inherited 
actions of role4} ∪ {union actions: inherited actions of role5}. Negative test cases are 
⌐{{union actions: inherited actions of role4} ∪ {union actions: inherited actions of 
role5}}. 
3.2.3 Optimizing Negative Test Cases  
This testing coverage criterion is to test for all vulnerabilities related to actions for 
each role. It creates positive test cases for every role’s unique action and inherited 
actions. And negative test cases are created based on all actions which are not inherited 
and unique actions for a role. However, despite the optimizations suggested in the 
previous chapters the number of test cases could be enormous.  
In this section, we first provide a motivating example and then describe a new test 
coverage criterion which can be used to balance the number test cases and the desired 
level of assurance. 
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Figure 7: Reducing Negative Test Cases. 
We can optimize negative test cases by considering only min under dominance 
role of non-authorized role r’s unique action such that r = min≥ (RH-authr(s)), where RH 
is the role hierarchy.  Negative test cases can be easily generated based on all the unique 
and inherited actions of role r. Consider if user is authorized to role2 in Figure 7. 
Negative test case for role1 relates to all the actions of min ≥ [{role1, role2 role3, role4, 
role5, role6, role7} – {role2, role5, Role7}] = min ≥{role1, role3, role4, role6} = role6. 
We can notice that this reduces the number of negative test cases by eliminating actions 
of role1, role3, and role4. This is under the assumption that if a user is unable to perform 
actions associated with a role r then the user would unlikely be able to perform actions 
associated with a role senior to r. In essence, we assume that the potential to harm 
monotonically increases with the number of privileges (active roles).  
3.2.3.1 Test coverage criteria 
 
Motivated by the above example, we suggest the following coverage criteria: 
generate test cases only with respect to the (mutually non-dominating) roles which are in 
at most k “fronts” from the subDAG of the role associated for a user. A front is a set of 
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roles which are the “same distance” from a given role node in the role hierarchy obtained 
from deleting the role’s subDAG from the entire role hierarchy. The parameter k could be 
adjusted to control the number of negative tests to be generated (and correspondingly the 
level of security assurance desired). Figure 8 illustrates the optimization of creating 
negative test cases. 
 
 
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Role Hierarchy MTBDD (RHMTBDD)     3.3
Figure 9 (a) is an example of a hierarchical RBAC model.  In this policy, a 
manager (a user with role Manager) can create and cancel the account, a customer (a user 
with role Customer) can transfer and change the account, and a teller (a user with role 
Teller) can deposit and withdraw the account. Furthermore, manager can inherit all the 
permissions from customer and teller. Customer can also inherit all the permissions from 
Teller. Figure 9 (b) is another example of hierarchical RBAC model, where Manager is 
inheriting from two same level junior role Customer and Agent. Further, Customer and 
Agent cannot inherit each other unique actions. Table 1 (top) and (bottom) has the unique 
Figure 8 : Fronts Coverage Criteria. 
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actions and inherited actions assigned to corresponding roles illustrated in Figure 9 (a) 
and Figure 9 (b), respectively. 
 
 
 
          
 a) linear hierarchy                          b) non-linear hierarchy 
 
 
Table 1: Unique and Inherited Action for Figure 9a) (top) and Figure 9b) (bottom). 
Role Unique Action Inherited Action 
Manager Credit, Cancel Transfer, Charge, Suspend 
Customer Transfer, Charge Deposit, Withdraw 
Teller Deposit, Withdraw None 
 
 
Role Unique Action Inherited Action 
Manager Credit, Cancel Transfer, Change, Suspend  
Customer Transfer, Check Deposit, Withdraw 
Teller Deposit, Withdraw None 
Agent Suspend Deposit, withdraw 
 
We construct RHMTBDD with role nodes, action nodes and decision nodes as well as 
three terminal nodes permitted (P), denied (D) and not applicable (N) (described later in 
Chapter 4. Note not every RHMTBDD may have all the three terminal nodes.). Each role 
node represents a predicate corresponding to a role attribute-value pair such as "role = 
Manager". Similarly, each action node represents predicate corresponding to an action 
attribute-value pair such as "action = credit". We introduce a new node called the 
decision node in order to distinguish between the two same level inheritances (if they 
Manager  
Customer  
 Teller  
Manager  
Customer  
 Teller  
Agent 
Figure 9: Hierarchical RBAC examples. 
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exist) for any role such as shown in Figure 9 (b). As defined in [11] MTBDD has three 
useful characteristics. We have adopted these characteristics to build RHMTBDD. First, a 
MTBDD enforces a fixed ordering among the various nodes and all “policy” paths are 
traversed from a root node (there can be multiple root nodes corresponding to senior most 
non-dominating roles in the role hierarchy) to a terminal node. Figure 10 and Figure 11 
are examples of RHMTBDD. The paths 101 (denoting a Manager can perform the cancel 
operation) and 011 (denoting a Customer can perform transfers) are examples of policy 
paths starting from the senior most Manager role node in Figure 10. Restricted or fixed 
ordering among the nodes enables MTBDD to be a canonical representation of the policy. 
Second, in MTBDD any sub tree can appear only once as is the case in Figure 10 and 
Figure 11. This property makes MTBDD a compact representation of the policy. Third, 
MTBDD deletes irrelevant nodes from the MTBDD. For example, in Figure 10, we do 
not have D terminal node since there are no paths lead to it. 
In our sample RHMTBDD, an ellipse shape corresponds to a role node, a 
rectangle with round corner corresponds to action nodes and a rectangle with sharp 
corner corresponds to terminal nodes. Figure 10 is a graphical representation of the 
policy. In this figure Manager (M), Customer (C), and Teller (T) are role nodes. Credit 
(cr), cancel (cn), transfer (tr), charge (ch), deposit (d), and withdraw (w) are action nodes. 
Further, a rectangle with sharp corner corresponds to the end of the path called terminal 
nodes and denotes as permitted (P) and not applicable (N). Each node has two outgoing 
edges. Left edge is labeled as 1 and right edge is labeled as 0 in each RHMTBDD. If the 
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left edge of the node is taken the attribute-value of the node corresponds to true 
otherwise, if the right edge is taken then it corresponds to false. 
  If we take the path starting from the root 0011 (Teller can deposit), 100001 
(Manager can deposit), and 1001 (Manager can transfer), we can see these paths 
correspond to valid actions. The process for creating positive test case is to follow paths 
from a desired node and follow until it has reached the permitted node. Previously 
mentioned paths 0011, 100001, and 1001 are all positive test cases because they lead to 
the permitted terminal node. 
 
Figure 10: RHMTBDD for Figure 9 (a). 
 
3.3.1  Introduction of The Decision Node 
We introduce a new node called Decision Node (DN) to create RHMTBDD for 
RBAC1 model. The objective of DN is to assist RHMTBDD, if there are two same level 
inheritances for a senior role. DN is created when a role object inherits from two different 
junior roles at the same level.  DN is added as the left child node of this role. And the first 
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junior role is added as the right child of this role node and the second junior role is added 
as the right child node of the first junior role node.   
Manager inherits two different role objects Customer and Agent at the same level 
in Figure 9 (b). DN is added to the left of the Manager node and the Customer node is 
added as the right child of the Manager node. Further the Agent node is added as the right 
child of the Customer node in the RHMTBDD. Figure 11 depicts how DN helps to 
determine if there are two same level inheritances (mutually non dominating roles) and 
how DN restricts to perform actions among mutually non dominating roles. In Figure 11 
there is no path from Agent to Customer action and vice versa. This implies that Agent 
cannot perform unique actions associated with Customer and Customer cannot perform 
Agent’s action as stated in Figure 9 (b). Manager can perform all the actions as it inherits 
from all the roles. We apply this algorithm with more complex hierarchical RBAC 
model, where DN helps disallow any role to perform its unauthorized action.  
 
Figure 11: RHMTBDD for Figure 9 (b). 
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3.3.2 Structure of RHMTBDD  
This section describes the layout of RHMTBDD. The RHMTBDD is defined by 
the following three rules: 
1. Role with no inheritances: In this rule, first unique action node of this role 
node is the left child for this role node; and, each subsequent unique action 
node is the right child of the previous unique action node.  Each unique action 
node’s left child is the terminal node P. Further, last unique action’s right child 
is the terminal node N. The right child of this role node is another role node or 
the terminal node N.  
2. Role with single inheritances: When a role in the inheritance hierarchy has a 
single inheritance (i.e. the role node inherits from a single junior role), the node 
for the first unique action of this role is its left child. Further, the right child of 
this role node is its junior role node; and, each subsequent unique action node 
is the right child of the previous unique action node. And finally, the last 
unique action’s right child is the left child of its junior role. 
3. Role with double inheritances: In this case, when there are two junior role 
inheritances; the left child of this role node is a DN. The right child of this role 
node is its first junior role node. Further, its first unique action is the left child 
of the DN; and, each subsequent unique action node is the right child of the 
previous unique action node. Further, each unique action’s left child is the 
permitted node. The DN’s right child is the left child of the first junior role 
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node; and, DN’s left child is its first unique action. Further, the last unique 
action’s right child is the left child of the second junior role. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SECURITY TESTING FRAMEWORK: IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND 
EVALUATION 
 
 Security Testing Framework 4.1
Our framework takes as input an RBAC policy specified in XACML. The Policy 
Parser converts the RBAC policy into a policy graph represented in RHMTBDD. Using 
RHMTBDD, it generates test cases by following appropriate paths in the RHMTBDD 
from the root node to a terminal node, creating respectively the positive and negative test 
cases for allowed and disallowed actions in the policy. These test cases can be used in 
testing tool such as JUnit for testing the system based on the specified RBAC policy. Our 
security testing framework is illustrated in Figure 12 . 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1  XACML Policy Parser 
 The Policy Parser parses the Permission<PolicySet> associated with each role in 
the RBAC profile of the input XACML file. The parser uses DOM APIs [13], [14] to 
accomplish this task. The parser basically keeps track of inheritance hierarchy and 
maintains a list of the unique actions and inherited actions for each role.  
RBAC 
XACML 
Policy 
Policy 
Parser 
Creation 
of Policy 
Graph 
Creation 
of Test 
Cases 
Validate 
Test 
Cases 
Figure 12: Implementation framework for creating Test Cases Figure 12: I plementation framework for creating Test Cases. 
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4.1.1.1 Implementation of parsing policy 
 
We used Java DOM API to parse policies written in XACML [14]. DOM stores XML 
file as a tree structure. This Parser sets the root node and returns all children associated 
with this node. In order to access all the children nodes and their attributes, DOM 
provides many APIs depending on the need of parsing [14]. Further, this parser extracts 
information related to every role, inheritance, and their action and stores such information 
in a linked list. Furthermore, we used this information to create RHMTBDD 
corresponding to the policy written in XML. Figure 13 is an excerpt of the Policy Parser 
code. It finds “PolicyId” associated with “Policy” for role and stores this 
information in new object called RoleCreator.  The RoleCreator Class stores the 
information of each role, its permission, and its inheritance. 
 
1. NodeList nList = doc.getElementsByTagName("PolicySet");  
2. for (int temp = 0; temp < nList.getLength(); temp++){ 
3. Node nNode = nList.item(temp);                
4. NodeList children = nNode.getChildNodes(); 
5. for (int j = 0; j < children.getLength(); j++) { 
a. Node child = children.item(j); 
b. String childName = child.getNodeName(); 
c. RoleCreator rolecreator; 
d. if (childName.equals("Policy")) { 
i. Element eElement = (Element) child; 
ii. rolecreator = new RoleCreator(); 
iii. String role = eElement.getAttribute("PolicyId"); 
iv. rolecreator.setRoleName(role); 
i. …………………………………… 
 
Figure 13 : Parsing XACML Policy. 
Figure 14 has the output through parsing RBAC policy written in XACML. Lines 2, 
7, 11, and 14 have role content such as Manager, Employee, Teller, and Agent, 
respectively. Further, lines 3, 8, 12 and 15 have RuleId as to what action they can 
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perform. Lines 4 and 5 display that Manager can inherit from Employee as well as Teller. 
Further, Lines 17 displays roles, permission and inheritance described in policy. 
1. Permissions:specifically:for:the:manager:role 
2.  manager 
3.  RuleId="sign a purchase order" 
4.  ChildContentPPS_Employee 
5.  ChildContentPPS_Teller 
6. Permissions:specifically:for:the:employee:role 
7.  employee 
8.  RuleId="create a purchase order" 
9.  ChildContentPPS_Teller 
10. Permissions:specifically:for:the:teller:role 
11.  teller 
12.  RuleId="look at purchase order" 
13. Permissions:specifically:for:the:agent:role 
14.  agent 
15.  RuleId="update a purchase order" 
16.  ChildContentPPS_Teller 
17. [|manager: [sign], [PPS_Employee, PPS_Teller]|, |employee: [create], [PPS_Teller]|, |teller: [look], 
[none]|, |agent: [update], [PPS_Teller]| 
 
Figure 14 : Output of XACML Policy Parsing. 
4.1.1.2 Implementation of RHMTBDD 
 
This section describes the algorithm called DAGCreator to generate RHMTBDD 
corresponding to the parsed RBAC policy. DAGCreator starts with the roles in reverse 
topological order in the role hierarchy. This ensures that RHMTBDD is already 
constructed for all the junior roles when a senior role is processed. It checks if the current 
role node has one or two inheritances at the same level. The algorithm can be generalized 
if the role inherits from more than two junior roles at the same level – a role hierarchy in 
which a node inheriting from more than two junior roles can be converted into a 
hierarchy with each node having only two juniors by introducing some “virtual” or 
dummy roles.  A similar technique of introducing additional roles is used to prevent 
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inheritance of certain “private” privileges in the role hierarchy [25]. The structure of 
RHMTBDD for a role hierarchy in which there are at most two junior roles for any role 
node has been described in the previous chapter. Recall that, if the role inherits from just 
a single junior role, then the first unique action as an action node – a node which denotes 
a privilege - is added as the left child of the role node. Note that the edge label for the 
edge to the left child is always 1 – denoting “true” - and that to the right child is 0 – 
denoting “false” value for the predicate corresponding to the node from which the edge 
originates. Subsequently each unique action of this role node is added as the right child of 
each of the subsequent action node.  Each action node’s left child is the permitted node 
(P) since these actions are permitted by the policy. The role node corresponding to the 
junior role becomes the right child of the role node. Additionally, the first unique action 
of the junior role node is added as the right child of the last unique action of the role 
node. The action nodes corresponding to remaining unique actions of the junior role are 
added in a similar manner to those for the role node. Further, the least privileged node 
ends with not applicable (N) node. Figure 9 (a) is an example of this inheritance type.  
 If a role inherits from two junior roles, then the algorithm adds one Decision Node 
(DN) as the left child of the role node. Further, it adds the first junior role node as the 
right child and the second junior role node as the right child of the first junior role node. 
The action node corresponding to the first unique action of this role node is added as the 
left child of DN. The first unique action node of the first junior role becomes the right 
child of the DN.  And the first unique action node of the second junior role becomes the 
right child of the last unique action of this role node. The rest of the rule remains the 
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same as the one in a single level inheritance. Figure 9 (b) has this kind of role hierarchy 
and their corresponding RHMTBDD in Figure 11. 
4.1.2 Generation of Test Cases from RHMTBDD   
The test cases can be easily generated by traversing paths over the RHMTBDD as 
follows: 
 Generating positive test case for a given (single authorized) role: it simply 
performs depth-first search (DFS) [10] on the left subDAG of the role node. A 
positive test case is generated for each action node which can reach the permit 
terminal node.  
 Generating positive test case for a multiple authorized role:  We consider 
state-preserving (links that have been already visited) invocation of a sequence 
of DFS, subsequently starting from role nodes in the authorized set. The links 
visit while each DFS are marked and preserved for subsequent invocation of DFS. 
Each invocation of DFS traverses only those links which have not yet been visited 
by any previous DFS invocation.  Positive test cases are generated by the steps of 
the previous case (i.e., whenever an action node can reach the permit terminal 
node). The state preserving invocation ensures that the duplicated test cases are 
not generated (i.e., conceptually it performs the union of subDAGs rooted at the 
role nodes in the authorized set (see Section 3.2.2)).  
 Generating negative test case for single (multiple) authorized role: We again 
use the state preserving invocation of DFS. In this case, the DFS starts with 
RHMTBDD with the link state of all the links visited during generation of 
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positive test cases preserved. Further, the permitted P terminal node is replaced by 
denied D. The negative test cases is now generated by performing DFS for the 
role nodes which were not covered during the positive test case generation which 
is similar to the way for generating positive test cases – with a simple difference 
that the paths are traversed to the D terminal and consequently test-cases now are 
negative test cases. Intuitively, this process simply deletes the subDAGs 
corresponding to authorized roles from the overall RHMTBDD and generates 
(negative) test cases on the remaining RHMTBDD. 
 The above process for generating negative test cases can be refined to generate 
test cases only up to certain fronts given the role nodes in the fronts which can be 
obtained from the RH. In this case, it only generates the test cases for role nodes 
in the fronts following the above procedure started with the marked RHMTBDD 
obtained after generating all the positive test cases. The computation of the front 
on the role hierarchy is as follows. First, it removes the subDAGs associated with 
the roles in the authorized set from RH. The first front is the set of leaf node in the 
remaining DAG. The second front is the set of leaf role nodes, which in the DAG 
is obtained by deleting the first front and so on. 
Since the complexity of performing DFS is O(n+m), where n is the number of nodes 
and m is the number of edges in the graph, the complexity for generating all the test 
cases is same, where n is the number of nodes and m is the number of edges in the 
RHMTBDD. This can be established by the simple observation that the execution of 
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all the (mini) DFSes simply amounts to the execution of one (large) DFS over the 
entire RHMTBDD due to the state-preserving nature of the invocations. 
4.1.3 Approaches for Creating Positive Test Cases 
There are two approaches for creating positive test cases. The first approach is 
used when a desired role and desired action are given and it finds the result by traversing 
RHMTBDD till it reaches a terminal node which would be either “permitted” node or 
“not permitted” node. Table 2 shows the first approach for generating positive test cases 
for CheckOperation(Role, Roles’ authorized action). This method 
finds the role’s authorized action and checks whether the path ends with the terminal 
node “permitted”. The second approach is to generate all the positive tests associated 
with a given role. Table 2 lists positive test cases for CheckAllOperations(Role) 
to find role and associated results for all unique and inherited actions by traversing 
RHMTBDD. For example, in Table 2 the positive test cases will return “true” because 
they lead to a permitted node in RHMTBDD shown in Figure 10. 
 
Table 2: Example of Positive Test Cases. 
Approach 1 Approach 2 
 CheckOperation(Role, Role's authorized 
actions) 
 CheckAllOperations(Role) 
   1. CheckOperation(Manger, Credit)    1. CheckAllOperations(Manager) 
   2. CheckOperation(Customer, Transfer)    2. CheckAllOperations(Customer) 
   3.CheckOperation(Manager, Cancel)    3. CheckAllOperations(Teller) 
   4.CheckOperation(Customer, Withdraw)  
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Table 3: Example of Negative Test Cases. 
checkOPerationNegative(Role, Roles non unique 
action and non-inherited action ) 
    checkOPerationNegative(Role ) 
             1. CheckOPerationNegative(Teller, credit )                    1. CheckOPerationNegative (Manger ) 
             2. CheckOPerationNegative (Teller, cancel )                    2. CheckOPerationNegative (Customer ) 
             3. CheckOPerationNegative (Teller, transfer )                    3. CheckOPerationNegative (Teller ) 
 
4.1.4 Approach for Creating Negative Test Cases 
Creating negative test case is to find all actions which are not unique and inherited 
action for any role in RHMTBDD and generate test cases for those actions. This 
approach enables to test all the vulnerabilities for all those actions on which a role should 
not perform. Intuitively, we need to generate a list for unique actions and inherited 
actions for each role. Further, we create a function in which we take out all the unique 
and inherited actions out of this list and create negative test cases with these actions. 
Table 3 is an example of negative test cases for RHMTBDD in Figure 10. As mentioned 
earlier state preserving DFS is used for this purpose. 
 Summary of Framework Implementation 4.2
  In summary, we keep all the information such as unique actions (for a role) and 
its inherited list (the list of roles junior to this role) during the parsing in an object called 
RoleCreator. The Parser object returns a list of RoleCreator objects 
corresponding to all the roles in the role hierarchy. We give this information to the class 
called DAGCreator.  This class looks at each role’s unique actions and inheritances 
and creates the RHMTBDD. Further, we have created a class called container, where 
we store all security test cases from RHMTBDD for all the roles.  
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  Execution of security test cases 4.3
Test cases generated from RHMTBDD are validated in JUnit by developing a small 
banking application to find security violations.  The banking application contains 
Account, Bank, Manager, Customer, and Teller class. Account class contains methods for 
querying information such as who is the owner of the account and for operations such as 
withdraw fund, deposit fund and check fund for the account. Further, Bank class contains 
information about manager, a list of customers and a list of tellers. Hierarchy of this role 
is as illustrated Figure 9 (a). In this policy, Manager can perform “credit” and “cancel” 
actions. Customer can perform “deposit” and “withdraw” action. And Teller can perform 
unique actions “check”.  
Since JUnit does not have access control mechanism, we use the same mechanism 
for generating the test cases in simulating the access control during run-time, i.e., 
traversing an RHMTBDD to find whether an action is permitted or not for a given role. 
Note that the RHMTBDD used for generating the test case is different from RHMTBDD 
used during testing, since RHMTBDD corresponds to the policy that is actually 
implemented by the system. In summary, we used the following step for validating our 
testing framework: 1) We used the correct RHMTTBDD to generate the test cases as well 
as to simulate the implemented access control – in this case all tests, both positive and 
negative, were passed; and 2) We used the correct RHMTBDD to generate the test cases 
and incorrect RHMTBDDs for simulation -- in this case we verified whether the test 
cases which needed to be failed or passed return the valid results. 
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Figure 15: Security Test Cases. 
 Figure 15 displays an excerpt of security test cases generated for the application. 
The first test case testCustomerDeposit() is a positive test case. In it a customer 
account is created and bt.checkOperation is called. The object bt is an RHMTBB 
object which represents the implemented RBAC policy. The method 
bt.checkOperation basically traverses the RHMTBDD to determine whether 
according to implemented policy this action is permitted or not – it returns true when the 
operation is permitted. Then deposit action is asserted by calling deposit method. 
Further, the test asserts whether the amount has been credited to the customer account by 
checking the current fund in the account. The last part is actually not part of security 
testing but functional testing. We have considered this portion here to simply show how 
security and functional testing can be performed together. 
The second test testTellerWithdrawNegative() is an example of 
negative test case. We follow the same steps for asserting negative test cases as we go 
through for the positive test cases. The difference is that a different object, 
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bt.checkNegativeOperation is called which returns true when the operation 
should fail according to the RHMTBDD of bt. 
 Figure 16 shows an output of running all the test cases. For example, 
“testCustomerWithdrawPositive” and “testCustomerDepositPositive” are 
the results of positive test cases. And “testTellerWithdrawNegative” and 
“testTellerDepositNegative” are the results of negative test cases. As we can 
notice, there exist two errors. These show if the policy is implemented correctly and 
which operation failed as well. 
 
Figure 16: Results of Security Test Cases. 
 Evaluation 4.4
4.4.1 Evaluation of Maximum Privileges 
In this section, we evaluate our strategy for reducing the number of test cases. 
Recall that we generate tests under maximum privilege actr(s) = authr(s). Additionally, 
it exponentially reduces the number of test cases. In order to quantify the advantage of 
this strategy we study the following three scenarios:  
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1. Flat scenario, where role hierachy is not considered. Each role is considered to 
be independent role.  
2. RH scenario, where RH is considered.  That is,  if a user has activated a role, it 
means it has actived all the role in the subDAG rooted at the very node in the RH. 
3. Maximum privilege scenario: in this case a user is assumed to have activated the 
maximum privileges pertained to  her roles in accodance to the role hiearchy. 
For our evaluation we consider the example role hierarchy shown in Figure 9 (b) 
where there are four roles: Manager, Customer, Agent, and Teller. Assume that the 
Manager role (rm) has one unique permission; Customer (rc) and Agent (ra) roles have two 
unique permissions; and Teller (rt) role has one unique permission. In the following we 
analyze the number of positive and negative test cases alsong with the total number of 
test cases that will be generated for the above-mentioned three scenarios when the user is 
authorized to various roles in the hierarchy. 
First, consider a user is authorized to all the four roles under the flat RBAC 
scenario. There are 2
4 
active sets. For each active, set we calculate the unique permission 
over all the active roles in that set. For example, if an active set has only Manager  and 
Agent  roles then the number of positive test cases would be 3 since the Manager is 
authorized to one permission and the Agent is authorized to two permissions. Further, the 
number of negative test cases will also be 3, since the number of permissions over the 
two other roles, Customer and Teller, sums to three. We carried out  similar computation 
for all the subsets and obtained the number of positive and negative test cases. 
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In the second senario, we considered RH. In this case there are only 6 distinct 
active set {},{rm}, {rc}, {ra}, {rc, ra}, {rt}. The reason is all other active set are equivalent 
to one of these active sets. For example  if we take {rm,ra}, this simply equals to {rm} 
because Manager inherits Agent. We calculated (number of positive, number of negative) 
test cases for these six representative active sets and we get the following results, 
repectivley: (0,6), (6,0), (3,3), (3,3), (5,1), (1,5), producing the total of 18 positive and 18 
negative test cases. 
In the third scenario, we considered RH + MP. In this case, there is only one 
active set which is {rm} where all the roles are active since manager inherits all the roles. 
We have 6 positive and 0 negative test cases. 
Figure 17 that RH+MP substantially reduces the number of test cases. For 
example, for the total number of security test cases, the case for RH+MP has only 24 test 
cases whereas RH scenario generated almost 78 test cases and the flat scenario had over 
154 test cases. 
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Figure 17: Evaluation Results. 
4.4.2 Evaluation of Fronts Coverage Approach 
In this chapter we evaluate the effectiveness of front coverage approach. Consider 
the role hierarchy in Figure 18 (a). The table in Figure 18 (b) gives the unique actions 
corresponding to each role in the role hierarchy.  
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a)       b) 
Figure 18: Example of a) role hierarchy for front coverage and b) the corresponding unique 
actions associated with each role in the hierarchy. 
 
 
a)                                             b)                                             c) 
Figure 19: Results of FCC for a) Teller role and b) Customer role; and c) Over all the roles 
for various k values. 
 
We compute the number of negative test cases that will be generated for various 
roles in the hierarchy while the value of k (the number of fronts that are considered) 
varies. Figure 19 (a) shows the number of negative test cases generated for k=1 through 5 
for the Teller role. Similarly, Figure 19 (b) shows the number of negative test cases 
generated for k=1 through 5 for the Customer role. Finally, Figure 19 (c) shows the 
number of negative test cases generated for k=1 through 5 over all the roles in the role 
hierarchy in Figure 18. From this example, we could observe that the substantial 
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reduction in the number of test cases was obtained for a lower k value. For example, for k 
=1, almost 54% reduction was occurred while 26% reduction was observed for k=2. 
Obviously this reduction may vary with the structure of the role hierarchy as well as the 
distribution of unique privileges over the roles in the hierarchy. However, our evaluations 
clearly demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of our approach.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 CONCLUSIONS 5.1
In this thesis, we have developed a technique for testing RBAC policies. It is 
critical to test RBAC policies since each policy is essential to meet and enforce the 
security requirements for preventing and detecting any security violations in the context 
of the access control requirements. Our technique incorporates the principle of maximum 
privileges, the structure of role hierarchy and a new security test coverage criterion to 
efficiently generate positive and negative security test cases. We developed RHMTBDD 
which is an extension of MTBDD to represent the RBAC policy. Further, we designed 
and implemented security framework to validate RBAC policies. This framework first 
parses the policy written in XACML to create RHMTBDD and then generates test cases 
by traversing the RHMTBDD. These test cases are created and stored in a container class. 
We validated and evaluated our security testing framework using JUnit as well as 
evaluated the saving obtained by our security testing technique through case studies. 
 Future Work 5.2
There are several future research directions for our work presented in this thesis. We list a 
few of potential future research tasks. 
5.2.1 Static Separation of Duty (SoD) 
One of the main reasons for popularity of RBAC is that it is easy to specify 
separation of duty constraints. Such constraints are part of RBAC2 (as well as RBAC3). 
(Static) SoD constraints specify mutually exclusive roles and prevent security 
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vulnerabilities which may be caused by a user having multiple roles which may allow 
him to commit fraud. For example in a bank application, the Billing Clerk role and the 
Account Receivable role should not be assigned to the same user. Hence, these roles can 
be declared to be mutually exclusive by a SoD constraint. Note that with respect to the 
given role hierarchy, if r1 and r2 are mutually exclusive roles then r1 cannot be a senior 
(containing) role to r2 or vice versa.  
Clearly, checking for violation of SoD constraints is part of the negative testing. 
For example, negative test cases for a user who is assigned to Billing Clerk role, will 
include a test where it would check whether the user can perform unique actions of the 
Account Receivable role. Hence, SoD constraints can be easily considered and these 
constraints can become part of negative test cases. 
RHMTBDD can be combined with SoD PMTBDD.  For example, in Figure 20 
policy P1+ P2 PMTBDD and P3 PMTBDD are combined to obtain (rightmost) 
PMTBDD  for P1+P2+P3. 
 
Figure 20: Representing Complex Security Policy. 
In general, our future work is to determine whether RHMTBDD can be combined with 
any arbitrary PMTBDD and come up with a procedure to create positive and negative test 
cases from the combined PMTBDD. 
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5.2.2 Integration with JET 
The test cases generated from our framework can be given to tool JET [26], [27] 
to validate the implementation of the code in the context of checking security violation as 
well as functional violations based on Java Modeling Language specification. JML has 
many characteristics and its own syntax [28]. JML can be used as a test oracle for the 
automated validation/verification of Java source code. 
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